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THE USES OF ABSTRACTION: REMARKS ON
INTERDISCIPLINARY EFFORTS IN LAW AND PHILOSOPHY
CATHERINE KEMP'

Legal scholars asking questions whose answers require careful work not
only in law but also in some other academic discipline have been issuing
warnings recently about the carelessness and/or hubris of legal academics who
appropriate the methods, insights, concerns, etc. of those other disciplines.'
Most of these warnings are directed at what we might call the intentional
wrongs of interdisciplinary research carried out by legal academics-self-conscious inquiries into subject matters which lie (at least in part) within the
bounds of some other discipline.' The efforts of the participants in this Symposium, although they at times involve issues lying outside the conventional
bounds of legal scholarship, do not, however, fall squarely under this criticism.?
The Symposium's brush with philosophy-as an instance of an interdisciplinary approach to law-is, I think, properly viewed as incidental. The group
decided to work on coercion, and found that Professor Wertheimer had written
a book on the subject.4 Although the focus of the discussion was primarily the
legal regulation of coercive relationships, in reading a philosopher,5 the participants inevitably encountered obstacles peculiar to interdisciplinary scholarship. This type of minor collision, although not the primary target of scholars
cataloging the afflictions and desiderata of interdisciplinary research, nevertheless raises a couple of important issues about such research, in particular about
the mutual perceptions and joint ventures of philosophers and legal academics.
In these Remarks I want to pursue two claims. First, from the vantage of one
discipline, the perceptual virtues6 do not necessarily grace investigations into
the researches of another discipline, so that subject matters, controversies, and

* Assistant Professor of Philosophy, University of Colorado at Denver. B.A. 1987,
Earlham College; Ph.D. 1995, State University of New York at Stony Brook; J.D. 1996, The
University of Texas School of Law. I wish to thank Elizabeth Chambliss, Mark Tanzer, and Nancy Ehrenreich for their insight and conversation on the subject of these Remarks, and the members
of the University of Denver College of Law Symposium on Coercion for their kindness in inviting
me to participate.
1. See Francis J. Mootz m, Law and Philosophy, Philosophy and Law, 26 U. TOL. L. REv.
127 (1994); see, e.g., Brian Leiter, Intellectual Voyeurism in Legal Scholarship, 4 YALE J.L. &
HUMAN. 79 (1992).
2. Mootz, supra note 1, at 128-136 (reviewing types of criticism levelled by philosophers at
legal scholars appropriating philosophical material).
3. Symposium, Coercion: An InterdisciplinaryExamination of Coercion, Exploitation, and
the Law, 74 DENy. U. L. REv. 875 (1997).
4. ALAN WERTHEimER, CoERCION (1987).
5. Professor Wertheimer.
6. Perspective, proportion, depth, and relation.
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strands of theoretical development located in one discipline often appear out of
context to scholars trained in another. Second, degrees and types of abstraction
form a notable instance of this phenomenon, especially for interdisciplinary
work in law and philosophy.
The first part of these Remarks addresses this issue of context as it affects
interdisciplinary work in law and philosophy. The second part begins with the
observation of several Symposium participants 7 that Professor Wertheimer's
theory about coercion is unexpectedly abstract,given his disdain for "conceptual analysis,"8 and then considers different types of abstraction and the ways
in which this variety can be misleading when viewed across boundaries of
academic disciplines. The third part reviews divisions among contemporary
moral theorists in the hope that this will help locate some of the differences
between Professor Wertheimer and some of the Symposium participants in
substantive controversies over the proper approach to questions of morality.
I.
"Mr. Tucker, let me introduce you to Dr. Bunney: he too is
passionately interested in phonetics." The Duchess gave a commanding nod at the ugly publisher, who instantly entered on a subject
about which he knew nothing at all ....
"And what," asked Tucker gravely, "do you think of this younger
German school?" The question was ninety-nine percent safe. Bunney
was enchanted. Conversation went smoothly and efficiently on.9
Critics of interdisciplinary legal scholarship argue that most of the scholars with legal training who make forays into other disciplines do not have the
competence to read or pronounce on what they find, or to determine its pertinence to the aspect of the law which inspired the expedition in the first
place.' This criticism, as I have already suggested, is really directed at intentional border crossings by scholars seeking insight or material from another
discipline. The Symposium discussions instead encountered a related but different obstacle in the remarks Professor Wertheimer makes about his approach
to the question of coercion and about the nature of his conclusions." Many
of these remarks come out of, and are directed at, traditions and controversies
which are peculiar to philosophy and which by themselves are uninformative
to people not trained in the discipline. 2 However, in this case and in other

7. See, e.g., Nancy Ehrenreich, Conceptualism by Any Other Name... ,74 DENrv. U. L.
REV. 1281, 1284 (1997).
8. Wertheimer, Remarks on Coercion and Exploitation, 74 DENv. U. L. REv. 889, 890
(1997) [hereinafter Wertheimer, Remarks].
9. MICHAEL INNES, HAMLET, REVENGE! 28 (1962). Of course, most parties to interdisciplinary conversations are not as conscious or as specific as Mr. Tucker, yet his hunch relies on the
operation of the kind of seeming linguafranca I consider in this section.
10. See, e.g., Leiter, supra note 1, at 90 (charging Jerry Frug with irresponsible appropriation
of Friedrich Nietzsche); Mootz, supra note 1, at 128-130.
11. See WERTHEIMER, ExpLOrrATION 8 (1996); Wertheimer, Remarks, supra note 8, at 2;
infra Part H.
12. See infra Part B.
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similar situations,'3 the terms in which these kinds of remarks are expressed
often seem familiar to non-philosophers, either because they do not appear to

be terms of art or because they are technical terms in their own right in the
area in which the non-philosophers are trained. Such terms float, as it were,
like objects on a spatially indeterminate background, shorn of the proportions
and relations they bear to each other and to the traditions which form their
contexts. This effect troubles many interdisciplinary discussions, even those
we would consider otherwise modest and well-intentioned, 4 and is, I believe,
partly responsible for the dissatisfaction on both sides which sometimes attends efforts at the appropriation of philosophical material by legal scholars. In
particular I would point out two types of confusion following on this effect
which are relevant to contemporary research in legal theory and philosophy.
First, in every academic discipline there are historical divisions and controversies which come with labels by which practitioners can mark and know
them. These idiosyncratic features are invisible chasms to the non-specialist
who almost inevitably stumbles into them." This is no less true of philosophy as it confronts the legal scholar than of any other academic discipline or
area of activity. 6 The contemporary relationship between law and philosophy,

13. Encounters between legal scholars and philosophers, as well as any interdisciplinary
discussion.
14. I would put the discussions of the Symposium in this category.
15. See, e.g., Peter Gabel, The Phenomenology of Rights-Consciousness and the Pact of the
Withdrawn Selves, 62 TEX. L. REv. 1563 (1984) (conflating phenomenology with deconstruction).
Deconstruction is fundamentally critical of the project of phenomenology and should never be
mistaken for it. See Joseph Margolis, Deferring to Derrida'sDifference, in EUROPEAN PHILOSOPHY AND THE AMERICAN ACADEMY 195-96 (Barry Smith ed., 1994). See also JACQUES DERRIDA,
SPEECH AND PHENOMENA, AND OTHER ESSAYS ON HUSSERL'S THEORY OF SIGNS; (1979). Gabel's
mistake, however, is instructive for legal scholars working in and with the Critical Legal Studies
(CLS) movement CLS is devoted, among other things, to a critical project whose aim is to reveal
the internal inconsistencies of law so as to expose the power relations the law conceals. That is,
for CLS, legal doctrine is an appearance behind which there is something real, something the law
needs to conceal in order to preserve itself and the status quo. See James Boyle, Introduction to
CRITICAL LEGAL. STUDIES xiv (James Boyle ed., 1992). See, e.g., David Trubek, Where the Action
Is: Critical Legal Studies and Empiricism, 36 STAN. L. REv. 575 (1984) (discussing CLS' notion
of truth). Deconstruction, properly understood, objects to this kind of relation between appearance
and reality and to the metaphysical assumptions required for the relation to be coherent. See
Margolis, supra, at 208-09.
16. The most important and long-standing division among professional philosophers in the
United States lies between the Anglo-American Analytic and Continental traditions. For a general
characterization of the division, see NICHOLAS RESCHER, AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY TODAY, AND
OTHER PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES, 18-19 (1994); see also David E. Cooper, The PresidentialAddress: Analytic and ContinentalPhilosophy, 94 PROC. ARISTOTEIJAN SOC'Y 1 (1994) (characterizing the difference as, in part, a disagreement over the possibility of obtaining an impersonal,
explicit command of the 'rules' of language and other human practices). Many scholars view this
division as itself unphilosophical and ahistorical; it also ignores the non-Analytic tradition in
American philosophy, viz. American Pragmatism, Process and "systematic" philosophy. It is generally agreed that a rapprochement between the two traditions is in the offing. For a whimsical
characterization of this possibility, see JOSEPH MARGOLIS, HISTORIED THOuGHT, CONSTRUCTED
WORLD: CONCEITUAL PRIMER FOR THE TURN OF THE MILtENinm, 6 (1995).
I take sides and I don't take sides. I admire the sense of rigor in the "analytic" tradition,
and I admire the large spirit of the "continental." I deplore the intellectual stinginess of
the analytic, and I deplore the philosophical carelessness of the continental. I believe
they are literally the half-assed progeny of the halved stock of Aristophanes's joke in
Symposium. Those divided parts must surely be rejoined ....
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however, suffers under the additional burden of being the subject of a territorial dispute waged by different philosophical traditions over the right (or the
presumption) to define, delimit, interpret, and purvey philosophy for lawyers
and legal scholars.' 7 Not content with invisibility, the chasms in this case are
magnetic. What is worse, the effects of this battle are exacerbated by what
appear to be its echoes in the various controversies internal to legal theory and
to legal academia, some of which are very heated indeed. 8 Technical terms
which surface in the middle of such conflicts and confusions are likely to be

misconstrued and to remain unclear.
Second, the historical development and series of distinctions which characterize the intellectual life of every academic discipline are usually encountered piecemeal by non-specialists, and are thereby susceptible to misconstruction as instances of seemingly similar developments and distinctions in the
non-specialists' area of specialization. In teaching legal philosophy to philosophy students, for example, one has to point out that legal positivism is not at
all the same thing as the logical positivism familiar to philosophers. Technical
terms which mark developments and distinctions in one area can also appear
or be understood as making reference to controversies no longer confined to a

17. See, e.g., Mootz, supra note 1, at 134 (noting that Martha Nussbaum's recommendation
that philosophers bring rigor to legal theory and adjudication is polemical).
[Martha Nussbaum] emphasizes that only genuine philosophers are competent to fulfill
the role that she envisions, as opposed to the "sophists" of continental literary theory
who currently attract so much attention among contemporary legal theorists. Given that
philosophy is a deeply contested discipline rather than a univocal practice of rigorous
reasoning, one is left with the impression that, at bottom, Nussbaum simply is advocating the colonization of legal theory by pragmatic-minded analytical philosophers.
Id. (citations omitted).
Mootz notes in this passage that "[i]t is plain from the context that Jacques Derrida is Nussbaum's
unnamed villain." Id. at 134 n. 32 (reviewing Martha Nussbaum, The Use and Abuse of Philosophy in Legal Education, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1627, 1641-42 0993)); see infra note 18; see also
BRIAN LErrER, PHILOSOPHICAL GOURMEr REPORT 27 (1996) (ranking graduate programs in philosophy in the United States). "Students interested in 'postmodemism' (e.g. Derrida, Lyotard, etc.)
would be better off applying to graduate programs in literary theory, since philosophers generally
do not (for good reason) take this stuff seriously." Id. In his ranking Leiter rates only Analytic
programs, characterizing Continental programs as members of "the 'Continental underground' in
the U.S.-i.e. those American philosophers who shun analytic philosophy and work mainly in
Continental traditions (e.g. phenomenology, critical theory, postmodernism)". Leiter claims that
"the best scholarly work on Continental philosophy isgenerally done at the predominantly analytic departments." Id.; cf. Leiter, supra note 1,at 101-102 n.77. This is not the place to evaluate
Leiter's characterization of graduate programs in philosophy, but note, as evidence of the depth of
the chasms and the intensity of the territorial dispute, that his view is not shared by research faculties at Continental programs or by their professional organizations, and that people on both sides
are making forays into legal scholarship. Itis inevitable that these Remarks are themselves a kind
of salvo in this conflict; it behooves legal scholars confronting helpful-seeming philosophers to
ascertain the intellectual persuasion of their interlocutors.
18. By this, I mean primarily the late and perhaps continuing unrest over the presence of
Critical Legal Studies scholars on law faculties. See, e.g., Peter D. Carrington, Of Law and the
River, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC.222 (1984). The flap over CLS in many ways resembles the reaction of
all mainstream philosophical traditions, including older Continental movements to Derrida and of
the Anglo-American Analytic tradition to Continental philosophy in general. See EUROPEAN PHILOSOPHY AND THE AMERICAN ACADEMY, supra note 15. See, e.g., LErrER, supra note 17, at 27.
This is not to say, however, that CLS and deconstruction are the same project, or that mainstream
philosophical traditions should be construed as uniformly more sympathetic or more similar to
mainstream legal scholarship,
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single discipline (e.g., "materialism" or "formalism"). Encountered out of context, such terms lend themselves to inaccurate parallelisms of movements and
controversies between disciplines, which mislead and confuse projects relying
on interdisciplinary study. I turn now to the cluster of terms and attendant
confusion emerging from the Symposium participants' discussion of Professor
Wertheimer's theory on coercion and exploitation.
II.
"I am not a lawyer."' 9
"Professor Wertheimer is a political philosopher, I am an attorney. 2 0
The story behind these territorial claims, or rather disclaimers, forms an
excellent illustration of this thesis that technical terms appearing out of context
are troublesome for interdisciplinary work in law and philosophy. In this
instance, a misunderstanding over a particular set of terms which are significant in both disciplines has affected not only the substantive discussion of
coercion, but also the perception on all sides of the relevance of the interdisciplinary aspect of the Symposium. The terms at issue are abstract and its
cousins conceptual,formal, and analytic, each of which is frequently qualified
by the term merely. The misunderstanding has its source in the ways in which
these terms as they appeared in Professor Wertheimer's presentation were
understood by the Symposium participants. In this section I tell the story of
the misunderstanding, examine some of the uses of the term abstraction as
they are relevant to discussions between legal scholars and philosophers, and
recast the Symposium discussion in light of this examination.
In some of the remarks Professor Wertheimer makes about the nature of
his approach to the subject of coercion he rejects mere "conceptual analysis"
in favor of "moral argument informed by empirical investigation" as a means
of deciding whether to invalidate or prohibit certain kinds of transaction.2
These claims were understood in the Symposium's initial discussions to suggest that Professor Wertheimer rejects the kind of apolitical or metaphysical
abstraction associated in legal theory with various species of doctrinalism or
formalism' and rely instead on an approach, generally associated by legal
theorists with Legal Realism and its heirs, which takes account of the social
and/or political context in which the agreements are embedded.' That is, the
Symposium's members set out to examine Professor Wertheimer's theory
about coercion thinking that he preferred a normative, empirically-informed
(political)24 approach to the question over a value-neutral, "abstract" (apoliti-

19.
20.
21.

Wertheimer, Remarks, supra note 8, at 889.
Ehrenreich, supra note 7, at 1291-92, n.41.
Wertheimer, Remarks, supra note 8, at 890, see also id. at 892. "Mhe best account of
coercion is normative.... [t]he antinomy of normative is empirical or value-neutral . . . ." Id.
22. See Ehrenreich, supra note 7, at 1283-84; see also LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HisTORY OF AMERICAN LAw 617 (1985); Thomas C. Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L.
REV. 1. 5 (1983).
23. Ehrenreich, supra note 7, at 1284. See, e.g., Boyle, supra note 15, at xiii, xx.
24. Ehrenreich, supra note 7, at 1290 n.37.
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cal) one. Over the course of the discussions, however, the group found that
what Professor Wertheimer means by "normative" does not involve attention
to the social or political context of possibly coercive agreements,' that is,
having eschewed "conceptual analysis" as empty, he seems to rely anyway on
a very formalistic, abstract view of these transactions and of the parties to
them.26 Several participants wondered whether this penchant for abstraction
should be attributed to the fact that Professor Wertheimer is a philosopher and
not a lawyer.17 In her article for this Symposium, Professor Ehrenreich charges Professor Wertheimer with engaging in an undesirable (if unintentional)
merger of a formalist approach with that of progressive legal theory.' Confronted with these criticisms, Professor Wertheimer responds that his contributions to the Symposium are "philosophical, not legal."" What has happened
here?
The problem lies with the phrase "conceptual analysis,"" and with Professor Wertheimer's remark that a normative approach is not "value-neutral",
implying that conceptual analysis is value-neutral.3' Compounding the problem, Professor Wertheimer also says that his normative, non-neutral approach
is "empirical,"32 which conceptual analysis is not.33 Two strands of the misunderstanding begin at this point. First, to the untutored eye, Professor
Wertheimer appears to be rejecting non-empirical, value-neutral approaches in
general. Second, he seems to favor an approach to the question of coercive
transactions which is empirically-based and morally explicit. The first appearance lends itself to the conclusion that Professor Wertheimer is going to avoid
formal, conceptual, merely analytic, or abstract methods. The second suggests
that his positive theory about coercion might involve claims about the justice
of the transactions he considers, that is, their social and political significance.
As the Symposium participants discovered, Professor Wertheimer explicitly
rejects the second34 and seems to renege on the first.3'

25. Wertheimer, Remarks, supra note 8, at 901, 905; see also WERTHEIMER, EX LOrTATION,
supra note 11, at 270, 298; Ehrenreich, supra note 7, at 1299; infra Part IL.
26. See Ehrenreich, supra note 7.

27. This came up during weekly discussions in Fall 1996. It was at this juncture that I felt
compelled to point out that the abstraction in Wertheimer's treatment of moral agents, which the
participants attributed to philosophers, was instead peculiar to some philosophers but not others. I

explained that I thought that Professor Wertheimer had been trained in the Anglo-American Ana-

lytic tradition in moral theory, and that the significant division among professional philosophers in
this country lay between the Analytic and Continental waditions. See supra note 16. The Symposium participants were unfamiliar with this division, and it has been my experience that legal
scholars are generally unaware of it. This, of course, makes the territorial struggle among philosophers peddling philosophy to lawyers even more perilous. See supra note 17 and accompanying
text.
28. Ehrenreich, supra note 7, at 1284; see also id. at 1290.
29. Wertheimer, Remarks, supra note 8, at 889.
30. Id. at 890.

31.

Id. at 892.

32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 890.
Id.
See Wertheimer's discussion of "Background Injustice." Id. at 904.
Ehrenreich, supra note 7, at 1284.
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What does 'abstract' mean? Much of the controversy over the nature of
Professor Wertheimer's claims winds itself around the fact that there are several only partially-explicit and partially-distinct meanings for this term at play

in the Symposium discussions. Some of these significations go to the substance of Professor Wertheimer's theory on coercion, others to methodological
differences between lawyers and philosophers. Still others are relevant to
historical developments in the intellectual life. of both disciplines. I pick it out,
in part, because it forms what seems to me to be the locus of the difficulty in
this particular conversation, but also because I believe this group of terms is
especially important for interdisciplinary work in law and philosophy. This is
due to the fact that the number and variety of uses of the terms abstract, formal, and conceptual are staggering in philosophy, substantial in legal theory,
and relevant in several pockets of interdisciplinary research already mapped
out by scholars working on philosophical approaches to law. Even inside philosophy it is impossible' to formulate a grand theory of the abstract; a theory
explaining the variety of uses of the term in law and philosophy could only be
absurd. Nevertheless, there are a few simple distinctions between types of
abstraction which are worth pointing to for the sake of the process of interdisciplinary discussions.
First, it is important to ask what it is in relation to which something is
considered abstract: To a historical or political context?37 To the results of
empirical investigation?38 To a particular experience or instance? To a definite practical resolution?39 To something else? Second, as I have already sug-

36. Indeed it is undesirable.
37. Members of the Symposium rightly put Professor Wertheimer here, but not because he
rejects "conceptual analysis," but rather, because the normative theory he espouses prefers to focus
on the moral individual in isolation from his or her social and/or political context. See infra note
42. 56 and accompanying text, and Part III.
Notice that the legal formalism associated with Langdell sees law as abstract in relation to
its social and political context. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 22, at 614-17 (1985) (reviewing the
career of Christopher Columbus Langdell). Langdell was adamantly opposed to acknowledging the
social or political dimensions of American law, and intent on protecting the principles and formal
truths of law from the vicissitudes of political and legislative life. Id. at 614. Notice also, however,
that even though Professor Wertheimer's moral theory and Langdell's view of law may be abstract
in relation to the same thing, they are nonetheless abstract in very different ways. Professor
Wertheimer's moral theory, as we will see in a moment, is based on a certain way of looking at A
and B and at their transaction, rather than on an assumption, like Langdell's about law, that there
are essential-formal--truths about A and B. See infra note 56 and accompanying text.
38. Older, pre-experimental notions of science relied on the elaboration of abstractions about
observed phenomena; modem science is founded on both the abstract expressions of mathematics
and on experimental method. See A. C. CROMBIE, THE HISrORY OF SCIENCE FROM AUGUSTINE
TO GALILEO, 145-50 (1995); cf FRIEDMAN, supra note 22, at 617 ("If law is at all the product of
society, then Langdell's science of law was a geology without rocks, an astronomy without
stars.").
39. Martha Nussbaum characterizes one of the difficulties besetting interdisciplinary discussions in law and philosophy as the conflict between lawyer's desire for definite outcomes and the
philosopher's "concern for open-ended investigation and debate." Martha Nussbaum, Philosophy
in Legal Education, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1627, 1642 (1993). It is this version of the difference between legal and philosophical scholarship which inspired Professor Wertheimer's "preemptive
strike against those who will want to take me to task on one legal issue or another." Wertheimer,
Remarks, supra note 8, at 889. Professor Wertheimer received the Symposium's charge of formal-
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gested, when a scholar on either side designates something as formal or conceptual, it is important that non-specialists try to learn something about the
tradition and the controversy which (may) lie behind that designation. Third,
neither law nor philosophy is itself uniformly abstract or uniformly
particularistic; it is important to avoid stereotyping disciplines and movements
within them by simple distinctions between abstract and concrete, formal and
particular, conceptual and material. Finally, as I suggested a moment ago, abstraction or formalism is not itself a uniform phenomenon in either discipline,
and is properly an object of suspicion for non-specialists encountering it in an
interdisciplinary context.

So, on his own terms-in certain philosophical terms-Professor
Wertheimer is perfectly consistent.' In refusing to rely on "conceptual analysis" he is rejecting a particular kind of philosophical method.4' In characterizing his own conclusions as moral and empirical he is placing himself in relation to various controversies in contemporary (philosophical) moral theory.42.

ism as a demand that he take account of particular court decisions and fact situations. This, of
course, is not that in relation to which some of the Symposium participants found his theory abstract. See supra note 37. Indeed, had he obliged the Symposium in what he thought were its
demands, he might have come up with a Langdellian account of coercive transactions, which
would have been just as unsatisfying, although more familiar, to his critics.
40. Note that this in no way diminishes the misgivings Professor Ehrenreich has about the
"domestication" of CLS and related theoretical approaches. See generally Ehrenreich, supra note
7. Professor Ehrenreich worries about the effect of modes of argument like Professor
Wertheimer's on legal scholarship, an effect which is a consequence, not a cause, of the misunderstanding over terms of art.
41. "Conceptual analysis" refers to a method developed and championed by Anglo-American
Analytic philosophers in the twentieth century. It begins with the premise that traditional philosophical problems (in metaphysics, epistemology, logic, and ethics) are not really problems but
rather confusions caused by mistakes in language. Philosophical analysis looks into the concepts
and logical relations raised in a particular problem and "dissolves" the problem by clearing up the
conceptual mistakes. Problems which survive this process are really scientific problems. The history of philosophy under this method is a collection of linguistic mistakes made over centuries,
which, once dispelled, can be ignored. The goal of conceptual analysis in its most distinctive form
is the end of philosophy as a tradition and as a discipline. RESCHER, supra note 16, at 34 (1994).
Note that conceptual analysis is distinct from conceptualism, a theory in traditional metaphysics.
Reinhard Grossman, Conceptualism, 14 REv. OF METAPHYSICS 243 (1960).
42. The moral theory Professor Wertheimer relies on seems to be a kind of rule-utilitarianism. Rule-utilitarianism is a form of utilitarianism which relies on rules based on the principle of
utility rather than on the principle itself to judge the consequences of actions. JAMES E. WHITE,
CONTEMPORARY MORAL PROBLEMS 17 (3d ed. 1991). The normative aspect of traditional Law
and Economics theory is a form of rule-utilitarianism familiar to legal scholars, wherein definite
norms for adjudication are founded on a principle of "wealth-maximization" similar to the 'pleasure-maximization' of traditional utilitarian theories. See Gary Minda, The JurisprudentialMovements of the 1980s, 50 OHO ST. U. 599, 605 (1989). Both approaches assume that the moral
subject is an independent rational agent who exercises maximizing choices in his actions. Id. at
611; see MARK PHILIP STRASSER, AGENCY, FREE WILL, AND MORAL RESPONSIBxrY 183 (1992)
(noting that for John Stuart Mill the moral subject is an autonomous choice-maker).
Professor Wertheimer's distinction between "micro-level" and "macro-level" injustice and
his preference for the former in his analyses of the potential harm of transactions suggests that he
is primarily concerned with individual actors and the quality of their choices. WERTHEIMER, EXPLOITATION, supra note 11, at 8-10; see also Wertheimer, Remarks, supra note 8, at 902. See
generally, WERTHEIMER, EXPLOITATION, supra note 11, at 247-277 (discussing the evaluation of
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Neither of these claims, however, says as much as it seems to: Professor
Wertheimer is rejecting a rather formalistic method in philosophy. He is not
thereby rejecting all kinds of formalism, conceptualism or abstraction. Additionally, he may not be rejecting "conceptual analysis" for its abstraction, but
for some other reason.' He is adopting a moral and empirical approach to
the question of coercive transactions. But, in philosophy, there are many kinds
of moral theory," and many kinds of empiricism, some of which are hospitable to considerations of social justice, many of which are not. Further, some of
these moral or normative theories are very abstract,' and certain kinds of
empiricism can make Langdell look like a ethnographer. In this series of distinctions we can see that Professor Wertheimer's remarks about his methods
are couched in terms which are both familiar and differently significant to
legal scholars, so that what he says is (unintentionally) both misleading and
opaque for his interlocutors in the Symposium. The healthy suspicion I have
recommended about such terms would limit the damage they do to interdisciplinary discussions between lawyers and philosophers.
mI.
The abstraction with which Professor Wertheimer treats the issue of coercion places him firmly on one side of an important divide running through
contemporary moral theory. It is misleading, however, to characterize the
difference between positions staked out along this divide as a difference in

consent).
The aspiration to being 'informed empirically' refers to Professor Wertheimer's determination to make sure his claims are true to actually existing conditions of (individual) advantage and
harm which attend certain transactions. See, e.g., Wertheimer, Remarks, supra note 8, at 893.
(asking moral questions about pressures on prisoners and whether these pressures for us actually
excuse their conduct). I discuss the context for Professor Wertheimer's theoretical positionings
below. See infra Part III.
43. These are legion, and they are held by people working in many different philosophical
traditions. See REScHER, supra note 16, at 35-39 (1994).
44. See CAHAL B. DALY, MORAL PH[LOSOPHY iN BRITAIN: FROM BRADLEY TO
Wr-rGENFEIN (1996); DWIGHT FuRRow, AGAINST THEORY: CONTINENTAL AND ANALYnC
CHALLENGES IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY (1995); Stephen Darwall et al., Toward Fin de si~cle Ethics:

Some Trends, 101 PHIL. REV. 115 (1992); see also infra Part ID.
45. Some ae even abstract about the onus of abstraction. See, for example, RESCHER, supra
note 16, at 114:
A quandary of concretization arises when a certain generic act is abstractly desirable but
yet this can be accomplished only in various particular ways each of which is concretely
undesirable. The person facing such a situation looks to the pursuit of an evident desideratum, but is emplaced in the uncomfortable and unhappy position that there is no acceptable way to get there from here.
A schematic illustration of this phenomenon is readily produced. We have a
choice of performing A and not-A in circumstances where A can (only) be realized in
one or another of three versions (A,, A 2, A3). And the situation we now confront stands
as follows: A is realizable only via the several concrete A, ....
The basic difficulty is that abstract desiderata have to be realized in concrete
circumstances.... The performance of what is, in and of itself, a perfectly proper act in
A may-in the existing circumstances-saddle us with collateral negativities, with the
result that there just is no acceptable concretization of an abstractly appropriate desideratum.
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degrees of abstraction. That is, the theories themselves on both sides are more
or less abstract, more or less formal. There are, however, differences between
these types of moral theory in certain kinds of abstraction. In this section I
make a couple of points about contemporary moral philosophy and indicate
three ways in which contemporary moral theories differ in degrees of abstraction.
Contemporary moral philosophy is, in part, a collection of responses to
traditional moral theory' and, in part, the collection of theories about moral
subjects that tag along with various contemporary logical, epistemological,
linguistic, and metaphysical positions.47 Traditional moral theory' is primarily normative.' Responses to it fall into two very rough categories: those
which question the possibility and conditions of universal moral norms, 0 and
those which prefer a different account of the theoretical assumptions on which
a particular moral theory is founded." Scholars working in the first category
are usually identified with the Continental tradition," those in the second are
usually identified with a particular strand of Anglo-American Analytic philosophy.53 Beyond this point generalizations about Analytic and Continental differences in contemporary moral philosophy are unhelpful, but mention of a
few issues over which the two traditions part ways may help clarify the Symposium discussions.
First, moral theories in the two traditions differ in the way they see the
relation between people and the moral questions and decisions people confront, on the one hand, and the context in experience, society, and history in
which these people are found, on the other. In one camp sit theorists who

46. See FURROw, supra note 44.
47. See Nicholas Capaldi, The Dogmatic Slumber of Hume Scholarship, 18 HUME STUD.
117, 120 (1992) (noting that for Analytic philosophy "theoretical knowledge is primary and practical 'knowledge' has a secondary status"). This view and its assumptions are at issue in contemporary Analytic circles. See Darwall et al., supra note 44, at 128-30 (distinguishing two trends in
contemporary moral philosophy, one which sees facts and values as discontinuous and thereby
possessed of merely different kinds of objectivity; a second which holds that moral judgments are
objective in the same way as scientific or theoretical judgments). Note, however, that both of these
trends are formed in response to the problem of '"placing ethics' in relation to "empirical science
as the paradigm of synthetic knowledge." Capaldi, supra, at 126.
48. Deontology (Immanuel Kant) and utilitarianism (Jeremy Bentham and John Start Mill).
See WHITE, CONTEMPORARY MORAL PROBLEMS, supra note 42, at 1-4.
49. FuRRow, supra note 44, at 2-3.
Normative ethical theories typically offer the promise of applying principles supported
by a theory to particular cases of moral decision-making, thereby helping to discover
which of our moral beliefs are justified and which are not. ... The history of normative
ethical theory displays a preoccupation with universality, objectivity, and the autonomy
of ethical phenomena from other aspects of life ....
Id.
50. I owe this picture of contemporary moral theory to Dwight Furrow. He gives the term
"anti-theoretical" to moral philosophers who reject the possibility of universal moral norms. Id. at
xi-xii, 18.
51. Furrow terms these figures "non-foundationalists." By this he means philosophers working on alternative justifications for the kinds of claims made by normative moral theories who
share a commitment to the claims but not to the presuppositions of normative theories. Id. at 1, 3.
52. Richard Rorty is notable exception. See id. at 19.
53. See id. at 4; Darwall et al., supra note 44, at 115. For the distinction between Analytic
and Continental traditions in philosophy, see supra Part I.
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prefer to concentrate on individual actors in isolation from their contexts;5 in
the other camp are moral philosophers trying to work out the relevance of
those contexts to the moral status of individuals and individual actions." Professor Wertheimer's view of parties to transactions which may or may not be
coercive places him with theorists who concentrate on individual moral actors
and who consider the context of actions and transactions irrelevant to judgments about the moral status of these events.56 In one sense, those theorists
who think social, economic, and historical context is irrelevant to moral considerations see moral situations as abstract from those contexts. Professor
Wertheimer certainly seems to fall into this category."
Second, theories in the two traditions often differ according to whether or
not they -maintain the possibility of formulating norms, imperatives, or other
moral claims which are general or universal in application." Many Continental moral philosophers reject such a possibility, 9 while scholars in the Ana-

54. See supra note 42.
55. FURROW, supra note 44, at xiii (1995).
The antitheory position is motivated by the perception that when moral agents think
about moral questions, they do so not in terms of abstract principles with an aim to
systematize some large chunk of moral experience, but in terms of concrete relationships
with other people within the context of their understanding of those relationships, histories, and the institutions in which they are embedded.... To the extent that we think
about principles and rules, they are viewed as emerging from the aforementioned concrete relationships.
Id.
Among the contemporary figures Furrow considers is Emmanuel Levinas, whose inquiry is driven
by concerns about the relation of moral theory to history, in particular to the Holocaust. Id. at 140.
56. See WERTHEIMER, EXPLOITATION, supra note 11, at 8 (defining the "micro-level" of individual transactions as the "locus of exploitation" which is the proper object of moral concern);
id. at 268-271 (distinguishing features of social, economic, and/or historical context from morally
relevant features of individual consent).
I do not think that we should say that hard circumstances constitute a defect in consent. ... [W]e should not elide the distinction between problems in one's objective
circumstances or background conditions in which choices are made and problems in the
quality of choice that one is making given those background conditions.
Id. at 270; see also Wertheimer, Remarks, supra note 8, at 901 ("It is important to note that the
injustice of B's background conditions must be distinguished from B's 'moralized baseline' with
respect to A .... "). Wertheimer assigns features of the social, economic, and historical context to
a theory of justice, reserving for moral theory features of individual choice and action. See also
WERTHEIMER, EXPLOITATION, supra note 11, at 298.
[There is a distinction between taking advantage of unfairness (or misfortune) and
taking unfair advantage of unfairness (or misfortune).... [W]hen B's suffering is rooted in social injustice, it may (reasonably) be treated as misfortune by A, if A bears no
special responsibility for causing or alleviating B's suffering.
Id. (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
57. After the problem with technical terms, this aspect of Professor Wertheimer's theory is
probably the single most important source of confusion for the Symposium, for in it he most
resembles, albeit superficially, the classic doctrinalist who eschews consideration of the social,
historical, political, and economic aspects of legal culture. See supra note 37.
58. FURROw, supra note 44, at xiii-xiv (indicating that normative and non-foundationalist
moral theorists maintain the possibility of such claims while "anti-theorists" do not). See also
Darwall et al., supra note 44.
59. See FURROW, supra note 44, at 133 ("Moral obligation and responsibility are... characterized in terms of local norms and concrete relations with familiar others, which must be articulated in particularistic terms not widely shared across communities or traditions."). See also supra
note 55.
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lytic tradition generally do not. Professor Wertheimer's development of his
"characteristics of choice situations"w suggests that he thinks that there are
aspects of transactions which guide norms for declaring these transactions
coercive or non-coercive, norms which are general at least across American
legal culture, and certainly across differences in the justice of "background
conditions."' In this respect Professor Wertheimer's theory is more abstract
than those which see moral claims as irreducibly specific to a particular social
context.
Finally, this insistence by certain Continental theorists (as well as others)
that moral claims can only be particular and relative has produced problems
for the formulation of a notion of moral obligation which extends across contextual differences. That is, it becomes difficult to talk about how people in
different social and economic contexts register as proper objects of moral
concern.' This, in turn, has inspired some scholars to develop an account of
the relation between moral actors and other people which is "transcendent" or
unknowable but which nonetheless makes certain demands which function as
moral obligations.63 Such a moral theory is then both more and less abstract
than its Analytic contemporaries, including Professor Wertheimer's theory,
because while it rests on an assumption that moral claims cannot be abstracted
from social or historical contexts, its solution to the problems generated by
this assumption is so abstract it cannot be known or understood.
CONCLUSION

I hope that the variety in the uses of abstraction and among types of moral theory I have pointed to in these remarks, together with the little map of
contemporary philosophical traditions, is of some help to interdisciplinary
discussions in law and philosophy. Would that there were a moral to this
story of the Symposium beyond the cautionaries "Watch out!" and "Take
care!", but at this point, I believe, there is not.

60. See Wertheimer, Remarks, supra note 8,at 900.
61. See supra note 56.
62. FURROW, supra note 44, at 137 ("[I]t seems we are stuck with this parochialism if we
wish to preserve the basic tenets of the anti-theory position.").
63. Id. at 143.

